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Abstract
This paper examines the  effects of men's and women's  having greater bargaining power compared  with their
participation  in group-based micro-credit  programs on  a  husbands,  and having greater freedom of mobility.
large set of qualitative  responses to questions that  Female credit also tended to increase spousal
characterize  women's autonomy  and gender  relations  communication  in  general about family planning  and
within  the household.  The data come from  a special  parenting  concerns.  The effects of male  credit on
survey carried  out in rural Bangladesh  in 1998-99.  The  women's empowerment were, at best,  neutral, and at
results are consistent with the  view that women's  worse,  decidedly negative.  Male credit had  a negative
participation  in  micro-credit  programs helps to increase  effect  on several arenas of women's empowerment,
women's empowerment.  Credit program participation  including physical  mobility,  access to savings and
leads to women  taking a greater  role in household  economic  resources,  and power to manage  some
decisionmaking,  having greater access to financial and  household transactions.
economic resources,  having greater social  networks,
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In recent years, governmental  and non-governmental  organizations  in many low income countries
have introduced credit programs targeted at the poor.  Many of these programs specifically target
women based on the view that they are more likely than men to be credit constrained,  have
restricted access to the wage labor market, and have an inequitable  share of power in household
decision-making.  The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh is perhaps the best-known example of these
small-scale  production credit programs for the poor, and over 90 percent  of its clients are women.
Earlier work (Pitt and Khandker (1998), Pitt, Khandker,  McKernan,  and Latif (1999), Pitt,
Khandker, Choudhury,  and Millimet (2003), Pitt (2001)) has found that the effects of program
participation differ  importantly by the gender of program participant.  For example, Pitt and
Khandker find that the flow of consumption expenditure increases  18 taka for every  100 taka
borrowed  by women,  but only  11  taka for every  100 taka borrowed by men.  Pitt, Khandker,
Choudhury, and Millimet (2003), using a totally different approach to parameter identification,
find that credit provided women importantly improves measures of health and nutrition for both
boys and girls, while credit provided men has no significant effect.
What underlies these gender differences?  There are essentially two different  mechanisms
that can result in different effects of credit program participation by gender: (i)"empowerment"
effects, and (ii) standard  income and substitution effects.  Collective models of household
decision-making  provide one avenue of understanding "empowerment."  In a simple version of
collective decision-making,  the household's  social welfare is some function of the individual
utility functions.  Browning and Chiappori  (1998) have shown that if behavior in the household
is Pareto efficient,  the household's  objective function takes the form of a weighted  sum of
individual utilities, with weights r. The weight r can be thought of as representing the bargaining
power of the female  household member relative to the male household member in determining
the intra-household allocation  of resources.  When  r is zero, female preferences  are given no
weight and the household's  social welfare function is identically that of the male. In much of the
literature,  r is presumed to be increasing  in the relative value of female time and her money
income.  In addition, r may be altered through social pressure.  The parameter r, which directly
reflects women's power in household decision-making,  is one index of "women's
empowerment."The differing credit effects by gender of participant reported by Pitt, Khandker and
associates do demonstrate  that an empowerment effect as a consequence of credit program
participation; they can, in principle, be only the result of standard income and substitution
effects.  In an economy in which women do not work in the wage  labor market, participation in a
group-based credit program  increases  the shadow value of female time by providing a
complementary  input for the production of goods for the market by the self-employed.  In
contrast, if men still provide time to the wage  labor market, the shadow value of their time is
unaffected  by program participation.  Consequently, the self-employment  activities of women
fostered  by micro-credit may generate different demand  effects than the self-employment
activities of men fostered by micro-credit.  If the preference  weight r is unaffected by male
participation,  such participation does not alter the shadow price  of women's time either. The only
source of change  in demand  when men are the credit program participator arises from the income
effect associated with the rental value of the capital endowment  provided by the credit program.
Note that although male participation identifies the income effect conditional  on r, this
information  does not help disentangle the substitution effect from the bargaining (empowerment)
effect induced by women's participation.  Thus a finding that the effect of women's program
participation on child health differs from the effect of men's program participation (as in Pitt et.
al. (2003)) cannot be taken to necessarily imply that women have gained  power in the household,
even if women are assumed  to prefer child quality more than their husbands.
A modeling strategy that seeks to separate out the income and substitution effects from
the empowerment effect (on T) resulting from micro-credit  program participation  would make
difficult demands on the data and require strong restrictions on the form of preferences.  An
alternative approach is to collect data on attitudes by and towards women, and on their decision-
making autonomy.  This data is necessarily self-reported  and subjective, but econometric
techniques,  notably instrumental variables  estimation, are available to correct for the possible
confounding effects  of systematic variation  in subjective response.  Note that self-reported
measures of decision-making power, even if experimentally  elicited, do not necessarily imply
that women actually have more power (as measured by r), but they do add one more piece to the
accumulated evidence pointing in that direction.
2This paper estimates the impact of participation in micro-credit programs  on a large set of
qualitative responses to questions that characterize  women's autonomy and gender relations
within the household.  The data come from an extensive survey household  survey collected  in
rural Bangladesh  in 1999. We test the assertion that participating in micro-credit programs is an
empowering experience  for women whose life choices are otherwise restricted through poverty,
patriarchy,  and societal  or religious  norms. In addition, we examine the effect of men's credit
program participation on these same measures of female empowerment.
2.  Previous Studies
Over the past fifteen years or so, a substantial literature has been produced on various aspects of
micro-credit programs in poor communities.  A few studies of these studies have focused on the
relationship  between  credit program participation and some notion of women's  empowerment.
Goetz and Sengupta (1996)  present a decidedly negative  image of the effect of credit on
women's empowerment.  Using a five-level  scale reflecting the degree of control that women have
over the loans they take, they conclude that most women have a minimal level of control over
their loans, and that when  the time comes  for loans to be repaid, this lack of control can have a
damaging impact on the well-being of women. At best, they reason, women who have little or no
control over their loans will also not be held responsible for repaying them and thus they will be
left out of the process altogether and any special impact of lending to women rather than men is
neutralized.  In cases where men have appropriated loan funds and are subsequently unable or
unwilling to repay the loans,  women may suffer because they are forced to sell assets or go
hungry in order to raise the money to repay.  Furthermore, the authors suggest the potential for
women's credit participation  to worsen the degree of domestic  abuse they suffer.
The focus of the study by Goetz and Sengupta is not on empowerment per se, but on
women's managerial  control over loan use. The authors find that, according to their criteria, less
than 18% of women in the sample retained  "full control" over the loans they took from credit
programs.  39% of respondents were judged to have very little control or no control at all over
their loans. The authors make assertions that credit is fungible within the household, but do not
support these assertions empirically.
3Hashemi et. al. (1996) find that membership in Grameen Bank and BRAC have
significant positive effects  on empowerment  even controlling for women's independent
contributions to household income.  They find that even in cases where credit program members
do not contribute independently  because their husbands appropriate  their loan funds, because the
loans they have taken are not generating income, or for various other reasons, just the experience
of being a member of the program is beneficial  for empowerment.
Hashemi et.  al. acknowledge the problem of selection bias and the possibility that
positive effects of credit program participation on empowerment  are biased upwards. To remedy
this, they control for the respondents' demographic  and socio-economic  characteristics,
specifically age, education, relative wealth, religion,  geographic division and surviving sons and
daughters.  Unfortunately,  there is no effort to control for the significant unobserved
heterogeneity  that remains.  This unobserved  heterogeneity  likely includes the unobserved
attitudes and characteristics  of husbands,  wives and other family members, including pre-existing
women's empowerment and autonomy.  It seems  quite possible, for example, that more
empowered women are more likely to be able to join a micro-credit  program.
Hashemi  et. al. also  include a variable representing  duration of membership  to test
whether there  is a change over time in the effect of credit on empowerment.  They consider this
variable as an additional means of controlling for selection bias because  "a significant duration
effect would strongly suggest that credit programs further empower the women who join them."
In making this assertion, the authors fail to recognize that, just as the decision to join a credit
program  is endogenous and likely to be correlated  with ithe unobservable  empowerment
endowment,  so too are (1) how early one joins a program, and (2)  whether (and when) one
decides to discontinue  membership in the program.  Thus it is likely that unobservable
heterogeneity in empowerment  is correlated with duration of membership. It would be plausible
to suggest, for example, that women  who are initially more empowered might remain in credit
programs while those who are relatively less empowered drop out due to family pressure,
inability to use credit effectively,  lack of confidence  in one's own ability to invest wisely, or any
number of other (empowerment related) factors.
The methodology used by these authors contrasts program villages to a "comparison
4sample"  of non-program  villages based on region, population density, and village size. Due to the
impossibility of finding two villages that are "identical"  in all characteristics  that might affect
measures of empowerment,  such an approach  is inherently problematic because it neglects the
potential for village-level unobservable characteristics to bias the results. i.
Interestingly, Hashemi  et. al. note that among non-participants, residence  in villages with
Grameen Bank programs has a positive and statistically significant effect on empowerment.  They
note that this could be the result of (I) non-random program placement and/or (2) spillover
effects (such that the existence of a Grameen Bank program  changes village society in such a
way as to effect the empowerment of non-participants  as well as participants) and that it is
impossible to disentangle the two effects.  It should be noted that whereas the former creates
heterogeneity bias, the latter actually represents effects of the program, and thus contains
information on the ability of programs to empower women (both members and non-members
residing  in the same villages).  As described in Pitt and Khandker (1998), the existence of
spillover effects does not affect the consistency of any estimate of the effect of credit on a
dependent outcome, but it does alter the interpretation of the estimate.
Hashemi et. al.  (1996)  create an "index" of empowerment  through a linear weighted
combination of individual empowerment  indicators.  The authors do acknowledge the
arbitrariness of this index approach. They establish a cutoff point at the 30t'  percentile (again,
arbitrarily chosen) such that women who score above this cutoff are labeled empowered and
those who score below it are labeled unempowered This system reduces the measure of
empowerment,  previously existing along a continuum, to a single binary outcome for each of
eight categories.  These eight categories are  further compacted  into a "composite  empowerment
indicator" such that a woman was labeled empowered overall if she had been  labeled
"empowered"  in at least three of the eight categories and was labeled unempowered otherwise.
' Indeed,  as will  be discussed  below, we find strong evidence that village-level  heterogeneity is an important source
of bias exists in this sample.  Hausman  and Breusch-Pagan  tests on  all empowerment  factors in this study reveal that
a fixed-effects  model at the thana (sub-district)  level  is insufficient  to correct for this bias, implying that village level
heterogeneity  is a significant source of bias even controlling for all thana-level heterogeneity.
5Again, the choice of five-out-of-eight  as the cutoff mark by which to reduce  the eight categorical
binaries to one single binary represents an arbitrary choice on behalf of the researchers.
A study by Mizan (1993)  uses a similar approach to that of Hashemi et al (1996). Mizan
also uses an index, called the Household Decision Making (HHDM) Scale,  which is computed
from answers  to questions regarding:  decisions of food purchase,  education and marriage of
children, expenses on medication for self and husband,  investment woman's earnings in business,
purchase  and sale of land, hiring of outside labor,  purchase of agricultural  inputs, providing
financial support to husband's family, and purchase of clothes for self and other household
members.  The coding used is as follows: decision made by husband  only=1, decision made
jointly by husband and wife=2, and decision made by wife only=3.  Thus, the DMS registers a
higher value for a higher level of female  bargaining power. Mizan's study uses a sample of 100
participating women chosen from two villages (50 women in each village) and  100 non-
borrowers,  without control  for self-selection  into the programs.
Mizan finds that the number of years a woman had borrowed  from the Grameen Bank and
the approximate monthly income from the Grameen Bank investment both had a positive and
statistically significant effect on the HHDM score. The conclusion of the study is that Grameen
Bank participation raises women's decision-making power within households  because it increases
women's employment and income earnings.  The study also finds that participation  has a
significant effect on fertility control ability.  The variables "Income"  and "Years of loan"  are both
positively correlated with the HHDM score when the other is controlled for.  Also, "Income"
(from Grameen Bank)  is significant when participation (dummy) is controlled.  Mizan concludes
that "this suggests that apart from the financial resources  a woman gains, an effect of the
experience  with Grameen Bank is important by itself." (120)
3.  Data
The data used in this paper come from a large household survey conducted in 1998/99, which is a
follow-up survey of an earlier survey conducted in 1991/92. Both household surveys were
conducted  by the Bangladesh  Institute for Development  Studies (BIDS) in collaboration with the
World Bank. Only the follow-up survey (conducted  in 1998/99) included a special  module on
6women's empowerment.
The base household  survey interviewed  1,798 households  randomly drawn from 87
villages of 29 thanas in rural Bangladesh.  Of these 29 thanas, 24 were program thanas (8 from
each of the three programs:  Grameen Bank, BRAC, and BRDB RD- 12 project), and 5 were non-
program thanas.  Three villages in each program thana were randomly selected from a list of
program villages in which a program had been in operation  for at least three years.  Three
villages in each non-program thana were also randomly selected  from the village census of the
Government of Bangladesh.  From the village census list of households,  20 households  from
each village were drawn using stratified random sampling. Out of these households,  17 were
target (owned  land of one-half acre or less, and hence qualified for program participation)  and 3
nontarget (owned land of more than one-half acre, and hence did not qualify for program
participation).  To ensure that a sufficient number of program participating households  were
included in the target households in program villages,  participant households were overdrawn.2
Of the 1,798 households  selected,  1,538 were target and 260 were nontarget households. Among
the target households,  905 (59 percent)  participated  in a credit program.  The program villages
surveyed had either male and female credit groups,  or both: 40 had credit groups for both men
and women,  22 had female-only  groups, and  10  had male-only groups. The existence of villages
with only female or only male groups is a key feature of the parameter identification method
described  below.  A more detailed description of this survey can be found in Khandker (1998).
These households were revisited in  1998/99.  The resurvey  tried to include all households
from thel991/92  survey, including  splits, plus added some new households.3 A sample of 2074
households with married couples  was administered the women's empowerment  questionnaire.
Table  I shows the distribution of households across  the eight categories of program  credit,
broken down by gender.  Table 2 lists all of the empowerment  questions asked.  The name of the
2 An additional 58 households were selected from  15 villages of 5 program  thanas (covering  all three programs),
because a nutrition survey was additionally conducted  in those villages and a larger number of target households was
required.
3 After the  1991/92 survey, one or more  microcredit programs  moved to some control villages of 1991/92 survey,
making them program  villages. So three new thanas (with three villages in each  thana) were  added  In addition, two
more villages were added to  previous nonprogram  thanas.  In the program  thanas,  six new villages were added.
Altogether  104 villages from 32 thanas were  included  13 1 were missing during the resurvey.  Up to 4 new
7variable,  the full (translated) text of the question, the coding of the variable ("Y"  standing for a
"yes"  answer and "N" standing for a "no" answer), and an indicator of who was asked the
question (husband or wife) are provided.  Approximately 80 percent of the questions were asked
only of wives.
The survey questions are grouped into the following headings:
a. Economic decision making
For each of four economic  issues, women were asked how their households  arrived at decisions
and whether they themselves spent money on such projects. The issues were: (1) house repair and
construction,  (2) livestock  sale and purchase,  (3) borrowing money, and (4)  transactions
involving household equipment. For the last three issues, roughly half of respondents answered
that they and their husbands jointly decided on the issue and implemented the action together (53,
54, and 47 percent, respectively).  For the issue of housing repair/construction,  the figure was
about two-thirds. The two most common other answers for all four issues were that the husband
decided the issue and implemented alone or that the couple decided jointly but the husband
implemented  alone. For all four issues, it was very rare  for women to report either that they alone
decided and implemented their decision or that they decided alone and implemented jointly with
the husband.  For each issue, less than 3 percent of respondents answered that they themselves
decided on these issues alone. Similarly, for all four issues, almost all the respondents  (98, 98,  97
and 98.5  percent, respectively)  said that they themselves do not spend money in such matters,
rather it is the husband that actually handled the money in the transaction.
b. Purchasing  capacity
For seven categories of common household purchases (food, toiletries, candies for the children,
cooking  utensils, furniture, children's clothing,  and own clothing)  women were asked whether  or
not they (rather than someone else in the household) make the purchase  and, if so, whether or not
they make the purchase  without their husbands' permission.  The percentage  of women who
answered that they make purchases themselves varies widely by category,  from less than five
households were added  from old villages to compensate  for the  loss.
8percent (for furniture)  to more than sixty percent (for candies  and household utensils).  When
husbands were asked about their wives' freedom  to make purchases,  87% responded that their
wives are not able to buy assets on their own without the husband's permission.
c.  Control Over Loans
A growing literature in the field of micro-credit addresses the degree  to which credit is fungible
within the household.4 Of central  importance is whether or not women retain control over their
loans and management power of the activities for which the loans are used. In cases where  wives
had taken small  loans, from any source, 78% of husbands reported that they use their wives'  loan
money to spend on their own income generating projects.  Among women who had taken loans
for income- generating activities,  only 5% reported having total autonomous control over the
money.  56% reported  that they share control over the loan money with their husbands, and 38%
reported  that their husbands have sole control over the proceeds of the loan.
d.  Control over income and savings
Traditionally,  women in Bangladesh have very little contact with the labor market  and generally
do not have significant cash incomes of their own. This reflects customary and religious
restrictions  on women's mobility outside the home. 62% of men reported that their wives have no
independent  source of income.  Over 75% of women reported that they do not operate any
income-generating  activity of their own and 78% of women reported not having independent
income that they could use at their own discretion (without consulting their husband). A sizeable
number (42%) of women reported that they do have their own independent savings, and if they
did, husbands were aware of these savings 91 % of the time. Wives expressed having a low level
of control over these savings,  with 85%  saying that they were not able to decide autonomously
how to utilize them.
Only around  15% of women reported having received  money from their parents, siblings,
or other blood relatives in the past  12 months. Of these,  95% said that their husbands knew that
4  See, for instance,  Montgomery,  Bhattacharya, and Hulme (1996), Goetz and Sengupta (1996),  and  Pitt and
Khandker (1998).
9they had received this money. Only  17%  reported that they had full control over deciding the use
of that money: 62% reported partial control and 21% reported having no control at all.
More  the three quarters of women (78%)  reported that they had at some point been forced
to cede money to their husbands and 56% of women  replied that their husbands had forced them
not to work outside the home. 81% reported  that they would not be able to give their own money
away at will.
When asked if they would  be able to get 500 taka in the case of an emergency, two-thirds
of women predicted that they would  be able to. The primary sources from which women
predicted they would borrow such emergency  money were from own relatives  (32%), husbands
(29%), and husband's relatives  (28%). Less than 3% of women in the sample replied that they
would borrow from moneylenders.
e.  Mobility
In Bangladeshi  society,  the physical mobility of women  is often restricted.  Traditions and family-
imposed restrictions  may forbid women from leaving the family compound, or may regulate
when, where, and with whom they travel. Additionally, issues of safety often prevent  women
from traveling alone for even  short distances.  83% of husbands reported that their wives never
went alone to places such as the market, bank, health clinic, and so on. Of these,  over half (55%)
explained that they or their sons always accompanied the wives when going outside the home
and another  18% explained that their wives were accompanied by neighbors or relatives.  Wives
responded  similarly. 53%  said that when they traveled outside the village they went with their
husbands and/or sons, and 22% traveled in the company of other women. Almost 9% of women
reported that they never left the village at all. 82% of women said that they had never visited their
parents without their husband's  permission.
f  Political  awareness and activism
Women in the sample were asked a few specific questions  relating to their involvement or
awareness of local politics.  Only 35%  of women respondents knew the name of their member of
parliament. While an impressive majority (86%) of women reported having voted in the last
10election,  74% also reported that their husbands had influenced  or compelled them to vote for a
certain candidate.  Less than a quarter of women reported  having ever publicly protested against
incidences of wife-beating.
g.  Networking andfriendships
Marriage in Bangladesh is characterized  by patrilocal  residence and village exogamy -- when a
woman marries, she leaves her home, family, and village and moves into the household  of her
new husband, in a new village. As a result, wives-and  new wives  in particular-may  not have
many close relationships outside the household.  In this sample, however, women generally
tended to express that they did have close friendships  and relationships  (possibly with their blood
relatives) outside the household.  85% of women  stated that there were people within their bari
with whom they were close enough  to share their feelings and 73% had such friends outside the
bari.
h.  Family  planning
In this sample, women were more likely than men to be users of birth control. Among couples  in
their reproductive  age, over 93% of men reported that they did not use any male birth control
method. Among these men, 65% explained that the reason was that their wives used a female,
birth control method, and  16% responded that they simply did not like to use birth control.-
Women's responses were similar:  over 91% of women reported that they had never been able to
make their husbands use a male birth control method. Of these women, 68%  explained that the
responsibility of birth control was usually given to them.
i. Attitudes
The survey also included several questions for both husbands and wives regarding their opinions
and attitudes on gender in society.  More than two-thirds of men (68%) replied that they believe
their wives to be less intelligent than  themselves.  79% replied that they do not consider their
wives capable of making decisions pertaining  to purchase  or sale of major household assets. An
overwhelming majority of women  (94%) stated  that they believe that their husbands  are superior
11to them "in qualities and education."  When asked why,  59% of these women explained that the
husband  is the earning member of the household and that this makes him superior, and 34%
stated that a woman's  lot in life is to be inferior to her husband.  When asked what kind of impact
women's empowerment  would have (or was having) on society, men were fairly evenly split
between positive and negative reactions.  Roughly half (47%) responded positively by claiming
that the primary impact of women's empowerment would either be the creation of a better society
or that it would be economic improvement  for the family. The other 53% responded negatively,
saying that women's empowerment would cause chaos  in society,  problems bringing up children,
or a disruption of peace within the household.
When asked to describe what they perceived to be the greatest obstacles to achieving
women's empowerment  in Bangladeshi  society, 46% of men cited lack of education  as the
primary obstacle, 23%  cited lack of safety, and  17% cited religious  restrictions. As secondary
obstacles,  men also cited religious restrictions (30%),  lack of income generating activities (22%),
lack of safety (21 %)  and the social structure (18%). The main obstacles cited by women were
lack of education  (47%), lack of safety (21%), and religious restrictions (16%).
j.  Spousal arguments and abuse
Women were  also asked to describe the nature of arguments that tended to arise within the
household.  The most commonly cited topics of arguments were children, money, and household
chores. More than a third of women reported that when such arguments occurred they were
abused in some way:  20% reported verbal abuse and  16% reported physical abuse.  Of those who
reported physical  abuse,  17%  said that their injuries  from the abuse had been severe enough to
require medical attention.
4.  Dealing  with Heterogeneity  Bias
As discussed above, most of the influential quantitative  studies on the effects of micro-credit
program participation  on the empowerment of women suffer from an inattention to the problem
of heterogeneity  bias.  This bias arises from the correlation  between the credit variable(s)  and
person-specific  or village-specific  unobserved determinants of empowerment.
12The econometric methods used in this analysis are essentially the same as those presented
in Pitt and Khandker (1998) and hence only an abbreviated  version is presented. This paper
estimates the conditional demands for a set of empowerment indicators, conditioned on the
household's  program participation as measured  by the quantity of credit  borrowed.5 Consider the
reduced form equation (1) for the level of participation  in one of the credit programs (C.), where
level of participation will be taken to be the value of program credit that household i in villagej
borrows,
C,,=X,,8.+Zl1,,1T+P+  (1)
where Xu  is a vector of household characteristics  (e.g. age and education of household head), Z.
is a set of household or village characteristics  distinct from the Xs in that they affect  Cy but not
other household behaviors  conditional  on C. (see below), /,, and 7r are unknown  parameters,  p,
is an unmeasured determinant of Cy that is fixed within a village, and g,  is a nonsystematic error
that reflects unmeasured determinants that vary over households.
The conditional  demand for women's empowerment outcomeyy (such as ability to visit
friends or make certain purchases) conditional  on the level of program participation C.  is
X,, /,. + C,, a+ U +  (2)
where  f,.  and c are unknown parameters,  u,  is an unmeasured determinant of  yy that is fixed
within a village, and  g,',  is a nonsystematic  error reflecting,  in part, unmeasured  determinants of
y. that vary over households.  The estimation issue  arises as a result of the possible correlation of
',  with  u,,  and of g,  withg,,.  Econometric  estimation that does not take these correlations
into account may yield biased estimates of the parameters of equation (2) due to the endogeneity
of credit program participation C,.
The standard  approach to the problem of estimating equations with endogenous
regressors, such as equation (2), is to use instrumental  variables.  In the model set out above, the
5The quantity of  credit is, of  course,  only one measure of  the flow of  services associated with participation  in any one
of  the group-based  lending programs.  These programs are  more than just lending institutions.  Nevertheless,  the
quantity of  credit is  the most obvious and well measured of the services provided.
13exogenous regressors Z. in equation (1) are the identifying instruments. Unfortunately,  it is
difficult to find any regressors Z.  that can justifiably be used as identifying instrumental
variables.  Lacking identifying instruments Z., the sample survey was constructed  so as to
provide identification through a quasi-experimental  design.
Our sample of households  includes households in villages that do not have access to a
group-based  credit program.  If credit program placement across the villages of Bangladesh  is
attentive to the village effects  ,,  identifying  program effects by comparing  households  in
nonprogram  villages with households  in program villages without controlling for the selectivity
of program placement will generally  result in biased estimates of program effects.  Using a
village fixed effects estimation technique may remove the source of correlation  between program
placement and the empowerment behavior of interest, however, without further exogenous
variation  in program  availability, the credit effect  is not identifiable from a sample of self-
6 selected households.  The parameter of interest, 6, the effect of participation in a credit program
on the outcome y,,, can be identified if the sample also includes households  in villages with
treatment choice (program villages) who are excluded from making a treatment choice  by
exogenous rule.  That exogenous rule  is the restriction that households owning more than 0.5
acres of cultivable land are precluded from joining any of the three credit programs.7
To illustrate the identification strategy, consider a sample drawn from two villages -
village 1 does not have the program and village 2 does; and, two types of households,  landed
(X,=I) and  landless (X,,=O).  Innocuously,  we assume that landed status is the only observed
6  In  addition, the effect of  any observed village characteristics that are thought to influence yj, such as prices and
community  infrastructure, are not identifiable
7 The validity of the assumption that landownership is  exogenous  is  defended at  length in Pitt and Khandker (1998).
There are a number of households in our sample that were program  participants and  yet had  more than  0.5  acres of
land at the time of program  entry, raising the possibility of  mistargeting  and  potential bias  in econometric results
relying on this targeting rule. It appears  that some of this excess land  is  either uncultivable or marginally so  Pitt
(I 999) demonstrates  that the value per acre of land owned by program  participating households who also own more
than 0.5 acres of  cultivable land at the time ofjoining is  a small proportion  of  the  value per acre of  the cultivable
land of program  participants owning less than 0.5 acres of cultivable  land at the time ofjoining.  This suggests that
program  officers are using some notion of "effective"  units of cultivable land  in determining eligibility rather than of
the type of  mistargeting  that would result in econometric  bias.  Pitt (1999)  discusses this issue at length and
demonstrates that treating the exogenous targeting rule to  be greater than 0.5  acres provides a consistent estimator
for certain  types of mistargeting.  He finds that application of targeting rules greater than  0.5 acres  (up to 2.0 acres)
actually slightly strengthens the qualitative results on the effect of credit by gender on  household consumption.  This
insensitivity of  results to the choice of  targeting rule used  in estimation to further demonstrated in Pitt (2001).
14household-specific  determinant of some behavior y,  in addition to any treatment effect from the
program,  The conditional  demand equation is;
= C  5 1 XA, 1 B ±  +  (3)
The exogeneity of land ownership is the assumption that E(X,,,  ')  = 0, that is, that land
ownership  is uncorrelated  with the unobserved  household-specific  effect.  The expected  value of
y,  for each household  type in each village is:
E(y,J I  j=  1, Xy=O) =  u,'  (4a)
E(y,J j=I,XuFI)=fl).+  uAX  (4b)
E(y,  I  j=2, X,,- 1) =A  +  ,u,  (4c)
E(y,  I  j=2,  X,=O) = p6 + p,  (4d)
where p is the proportion of landless households in village  2 who choose to participate  in the
program.  It is clear that all the parameters,  including the effect of the credit program, (,  is
identified from this design.  In particular,  the estimator of the program  effect  5  is a variant of the
differences-in-the-differences  estimator widely applied in the general program evaluation
literature.  To see this, note that an estimate of a is obtained from the following difference-in-the-
difference:8
[E(yu lj=2,X,,O) - E(y  lj=2,X,,=1)] - [E(yy Ij=l,Xy=O)  - E(yul  lj=l,X,=,)]  (4e)
If landed status is a continuous measure of landholding, then  the credit effect (  is
identified from variation  in landholding within the program villages  (j=2) and a sample of
nonprogram  villages is not required.
Even if land ownership is exogenous for the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary  that
the "landless"  and the "landed"  can be pooled in the estimation.  In order to enhance the validity
of this assumption, we restrict the set of nontarget households used in the estimation to those
with less than 5 acres of owned  land.  In addition,  we include  the quantity of land owned  as one
8However,  as Pitt (1999)  points out, since this  is  a quasi-experiment,  not an  actual experiment,  the direct application
of (4e) would most likely result in a downward  biased estimate of 5. The regression  approach applied here is
necessary to control  for differences in other observed and  unobserved variables across the four groups identified in
equations (4a)  though (4d).
15of the regressors  in the vector X. and include a dummy variable  indicating the target/nontarget
status of the household.
The exclusion restrictions that identify the effects of credit on the outcomes  y,,  are the
interactions of a dummy variable indicating if the household has the choice to join the credit
program  (which requires meeting the land ownership rule and residing in a village with a credit
program)  and all the exogenous variables of the model, X. and pj.9 In the results reported below,
these instrumental variable models are estimated by two-stage least squares.
An important question of this research is whether reported empowerment is affected
differently by credit if the program participant is a woman or a man.  For that reason, the
reduced form credit equation is disaggregated  by gender:
Cqj = X,,  fi/  + WI/  + 6,1/  (6)
C,,,,,  ",,<,8~,  + ,u~,,, +  ,  (7)
where the additional  subscripts f and m refer to females and males respectively.  The conditional
household outcome equation is then:
Y,,=X,IJ,  ,  +Pas  + C,C,  D#D, 1 + CC,,f  D,,,,  + c>s  (8)
where D1f and DJ,", are village specific indicator variables such that Djf takes the value of one in
villagej if there  is a female group in villagej, and zero otherwise.
Additional identification restrictions  are required when there are both male and female
credit programs with possibly different effects on behavior.  Identification of gender-specific
credit is achieved by making use of another quasi-experimental  attribute of these programs and
the survey.  All program groups are single-sex and not all villages have both a male and a female
group. The sample includes some households  from villages with only female credit groups,  so
that males  in landless households are denied the choice ofjoining a credit program, and some
households from villages  with only male credit groups,  so that landless females  are denied
program choice.
9Consequently,  the model is not nonparametrically  identified.  That  is, if the linear indices X^y and (XfB +  51, ) in (5)
were replaced  by nonparametric functions of the Xs, and 1,  the model is  not identified.
165.  Multiple indicators of multiple types of latent empowerment:  a factor analytic approach
Unlike many other measures  of human behavior studied by economists, women's empowerment
does not readily lend itself to measurement.  The large number of empowerment indicators
collected in the survey suggests not only that women's empowerment  is multi-faceted,  but also
that drawing conclusions from a large number of regressions may be problematic.  Some of the
empirical research on credit and women's empowerment has used some variant on an index
approach to address this problem.  In this approach,  answers to different questions  are weighted
and summed to form one universal  "score" that represents empowerment.  For example,  a "yes"
answer  to each of ten questions may be coded as one and a "no" as zero; then these ones and
zeros added to produce a 'scale' with a minimum of zero and a maximum of ten. Some studies
have used only one scale, others construct multiple  scales  for various thematic groupings  of
questions. This approach  is quite arbitrary because  the researcher must choose the weights
without reference to theory or data.
This paper treats subsets of empowerment  variables as containing an underlying  latent
factor, estimates  index "weights" using the methods of factor analysis,  and computes numerical
estimates  of the latent factor. Factor analysis is a set of statistical techniques often used when the
number of true "underlying dimensions" that describe  a condition (such as empowerment)  is
smaller than the number of observed variables.  Factor analysis converts a large number of
observed variables into a smaller number of hypothetical  variables, called factors, each of which
is a linear combination of several  observed variables.  The use of factor analysis implies that the
relationships between  certain types of observed  variables are stronger than those between others,
such that if observed variables are arranged into appropriate groups, the correlation among
variables within groups will  be higher than the correlation across groups.
The decision to employ factor analysis  is based upon our prior belief about the nature of
empowerment.  At one extreme, we could postulate that all the variables  in the study are causally
determined by only one factor, which we could call "empowerment."  An alternative  approach,
which we follow, is to postulate  that there may be more than one type of underlying
empowerment  factor,  but fewer than the number of observed variables.  We think it sensible, for
17example, to expect that those questions that pertain to political activism measure a different type
of underlying condition than do those questions that ask about reproductive control.
Consequently questions are grouped  into  10 thematic groups to produce factors representative  of
certain topics.
The women's empowerment survey provides discrete responses to all questions.  The
conditional densities of the responses of person i to questionj given the latent empowerment
variable of person i, u,, depend on the linear index given by
= /,+u, A  (9)
where  ,,  is the (linear) index, ,8, represents a question-specific threshold for a positive  response,
and A,  represents the extent to which questionj discriminates  between persons having different
levels of empowerment.  The Aj is the factor-loading  of the latent variable  in the linear index.  This
model  is known as the two-parameter  item-response  model, and has been used to estimate latent
ability using data from binary (true/false) test questions. Appending a non-systematic  error c,
such that the u, are the only source of stochastic covariation  among responses of any person, and
assuming normally distributed errors, this is essentially a random-effects  probit model with
varying error correlations.  In particular,  the error correlation between questionj and question k is
proportional  to A,
2k, as in Pitt (1997).  In the typical random effects model it is assumed that A.  =
2 k  for allj and k, so that there is a single error correlation p = 12. Estimation of this model  is
accomplished by maximum likelihood using Gauss-Hermite quadrature  for numerical
integration.  After estimating the parameters ,B and 2,, an empirical  Bayes method is used to
estimate the latent variable (random  effect) for each person sampled.  This estimation was carried
out with the gllamm6 package of Rabe-Hesketh and Pickles (2000). This is fairly demanding
computationally.  The same estimation was also carried out using standard  factor analysis for
models with continuous  responses. In every case the simple correlation coefficent  between the
probit random effects model  and standard continuous variable factor analysis  was above 0.95.
The results reported below are based on standard factor analysis, which has the advantage of
readily providing additional statistics on the "fit" of the approach.
Table 3 presents information on the construction of each of the ten factors and the results
of the factor analysis.  For each factor, the eigenvalue,  which measures the degree to which the
18variance of variables  is accounted  for by the factor,  is listed along with the names of all the
observed variables (component variables) that were used to create the factor.' 0 For each
component variable, two values are presented.  The first column of values presents the factor
loading for each component variable,  which is the simple correlation coefficient  for this variable
and the factor. The sign of each factor loading indicates the sign of this correlation.  If all factor
loadings are of the same sign, this confirms that all variables  do indeed "fit" in the grouping used
to produce the factor.  The second column of values presents the uniqueness of each component
variable, which is the portion of the observed variance unaccounted  for by the common factor
and hence unique to that variable.  It is computed by dividing the eigenvalue  for the individual
variable  by the sum of all eigenvalues  for all variables.
Those variables having at least 1800 observations  (out of a potential  sample of
2074) were used in factor analysis.  101  out of 132 variables met this criterion and were thus
eligible for use. The main reason for lack of observations  among the remaining  31  variables was
that the associated survey questions were answered  contingent on the response to a previous
question.  For example, the question "Do you buy household food?"  was answered  by all 2074
women in the sample, but the follow-up question "If so, do you buy this food without your
husband's permission?" was only answered by the  372 women who responded affirmatively to
the first question.
The selection of variables  in the 10 categories of empowerment  was based on our prior
belief about which variables contain similar types of information.  Out of the  1O 1 eligible
variables, only 75 were actually used in factor analysis (most were used only once, but some
were used to create  several  different factors). The other variables were not used since it was felt
that they were not directly relevant to any of the factor themes.
Since our prior beliefs about which empowerment  variables  should be grouped together
may not be universally shared,  regression analysis was performed  not only on the ten factors but
also on all of the observed variables,  including those that were not included  in any factor
grouping. Throughout the paper, the ten hypothetical variables created through factor analysis  are
0 The component variables for the tenth  factor are not listed, for the sake of brevity.  All the  variables in table 2 are
component  variables for this factor.
19referred to as "factors"  and the observed variables from the women's empowerment
questionnaire are referred to as "individual variables."
Estimation of the determinants of the binary responses to individual empowerment
questions  is complicated  for some variables for which there is little or no variation within
villages. The problem is that the village fixed effect perfectly predicts the outcomes for the
village. The village fixed effect goes to plus infinity if all responses  are '1'  and negative infinity
if all responses are  '0'.  This identification  problem can be cured with the additional sample
variation resulting by using thana rather than village fixed effects.  There are three or four sample
villages  in each sample thana. However,  it is first important to determine  whether a thana fixed
effect/village  random effects models eliminates location-specific  heterogeneity  bias. Hausman
and Breusch-Pagan  tests were conducted,  comparing a village fixed effects estimate to thana
fixed effect/village  random effects. For all factors, the null hypothesis  that village random effects
conditional  on thana fixed effects provide consistent estimates was rejected.  This means that
significant correlated  heterogeneity exists across villages within thanas than results in bias in the
thana fixed effects  model. Consequently,  all fixed effects estimates presented  in this paper are at
the village level rather than the thana level. It should also be noted that this finding provides
strong evidence of the need for the use of fixed-effects  in the model to control for non-random
program placement across locations.  Indeed, the finding can be interpreted to conclude that
heterogeneity  bias could arise from non-random program placement across  villages and within
thanas, not only across thanas themselves, suggesting that program placement in this sample is
highly non-random. This further demonstrates the problematic  nature of any methodology (such
as that used by Hashemi  et.  al.) that simply uses nearby non-program villages as controls for
program villages.
For each of the ten factors created to encompass  thematic information  on empowerment,
a Wu-Hausman  test was conducted to determine whether male and/or female credit could be
treated as exogenous, that is, whether credit is uncorrelated with the residuals of the factor
regression. The results of these tests are presented  in Table 4. For each factor, the results (P-value
and t-statistic) are presented  for the three tests: for female credit exogeneity,  male credit
20exogeneity,  and joint (male-female)  credit exogeneity.  Based on these results, the appropriate
model is listed for each factor.
a.  For six of the ten factors, the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the .05  level for a
Wu test of  joint exogeneity of male and female credit.  Thus the model adopted for these six
factors was one of exogenous male credit and exogenous  female credit. For these six factors,
both male and female credit is treated as exogenous  and the appropriate  model is village fixed
effects regressions  with no instrumental variables.
b.  For three of the ten factors,  the null hypothesis under the Wu test for joint
exogeneity of male and female credit could be rejected  at the .05  level. This model is consistent
with a scenario  in which person-specific  unobservables  are correlated with credit use, suggesting
some degree of self selection into credit programs based on unobserved traits which also affect
empowerment  as measured  by the factors.  For these three factors, both male and female credit is
treated as endogenous and the model  is village fixed effects with instrumental variables for both
male and female  credit.
c.  For one of the factors, the null hypothesis for the Wu test ofjoint exogeneity of male
and female credit could not be rejected; however, the null hypothesis for the test of male credit
only could be rejected at the .05 level. For this factor, male credit is treated as endogenous while
female credit is treated as exogenous, and the model  is village-fixed effects with instrumental
variables for male credit only.
In order to determine the appropriate regression model for the set of individual
empowerment variables,  a set of Wu tests was also conducted.  For each empowerment  variable,"
tests were conducted  of male credit exogeneity, female credit exogeneity, and joint male and
female credit exogeneity. ''  Those variables for which the null hypothesis for all three tests could
not be rejected at the .05  level are treated as being fully exogenous:  meaning that no instrumental
variables are used at all, and the specified  model is village fixed effect with instrumental
variables.
For the  sake of brevity, the statistics of all these tests (numbering  more than 300)  are not presented  to the  reader.
Instead, the  presentation of final results for the individual variables  in Table 6 indicates which model  was employed.
The choice of  the  model was based  on the Wu tests described  and  was conducted along the same  lines as for the
factors.
21In cases where  the null hypothesis  in the test of female  credit exogeneity could be rejected
at the .05 level but the null for the test of male credit exogeneity  could not be, a model of female-
credit endogeneity is used. In this model, instrumental variables are used to correct  for
endogeneity of the female credit variable but not of the male credit variable.  Likewise for those
variables in which the null hypothesis  for the test of male credit exogeneity could be rejected at
the .05 level but the it could not for the test of female credit  exogeneity.
Finally, some variables are treated under a model of endogeneity for both male  and
female credit,  and instrumental  variables are used for both. This model  is applied to those
empowerment variables for which, either (I) the null hypothesis  for the Wu test of joint
exogeneity of male and female credit could be rejected at the .05  level; or (2)  both null
hypotheses-for the test of male credit exogeneity  and the test of female credit exogeneity-
could be rejected  at the .05 level.
In all cases, estimated village fixed effects from the model with the corresponding  factor
are included as independent  variables  to correct for heterogeneity  bias resulting from non-random
program placement  across villages.  Several questions  in the women's empowerment
questionnaire are only asked conditional  upon the response of a prior question. For example, one
question asks women "Do you have your own savings?"  and the next question asks "If so, do you
control these savings yourself?"  Only those respondents who answer affirmatively  to the first
question respond to the second question.
In cases such as this, the question was recoded to apply to the full sample. Using the
example  above, the recoded question now asks "Do you have any savings which you yourself
control?"  Respondents  who have no savings and those who have  savings that they do not control
are both coded as answering  "no". The only respondents  with savings they control are coded as
answering  "yes".
There were three conditional  questions in the questionnaire  for which this was not
possible because the conditionality of these questions did not rely on any other question in the
questionnaire but rather on some other (unmeasured)  endogenous  condition.  These questions
were the following:  (1) "If your wife has a loan, do you spend this money yourself?" (asked of
men); (2) "If you have a loan, who controls this money?" (asked of women),  and (3) "If you have
22received any remittance  from your relatives in the past  12 months, do you yourself have control
over this money?" (asked of women).
In order for a respondent  to be in the sample for questions (1) and (2)  it is necessary that
the wife have taken some loan. The determinants of whether this event occurs (and thus, whether
respondents  are in the sample for questions (1) and (2)) are likely  to be correlated  with the
determinants of credit program  participation.  By definition, the determinants of "having a loan
(from any source)" must overlap with those of "having  a loan (from a formal credit program)"
because any woman who "has a loan (from a credit program)" also "has a loan (from any
source)". For question (3),  respondents are only present in the sample if they received
remittances  in the past 12 months  from their relatives.  The economic  literature on transfer
behavior suggests that it is highly unlikely that receiving family remittances  is orthogonal to
credit program participation.'2
The problem of potential bias for these three questions was resolved by using a two-stage-
ordered-probit  model (similar to that used to correct for self-selection bias) in which a the inverse
Mill ration corresponding to "being present in the sample" was predicted  from a first stage probit
and added as a regressor in the second stage. Accordingly,  the results from these three items may
be interpreted as "the likelihood of answering "yes" to question X, conditional  upon being
eligible to answer question X." Thus, for example, the results for question (1) should be
interpreted as "the likelihood of a husband spending his wife's loan conditional upon the wife
having a loan."
6. Results
Below, the affects on latent empowernent  factors of the male and female credit variables  are
presented in Table 5 and on the response of individual  questions within each factor are presented
in Table 6. The first column of both tables presents the effects of female and male credit under
the assumption of exogeneity (as in the work of Hashemi  and others), that is, without instruments
or fixed effects. Table 5 also present estimates with village fixed effects but without instruments.
12 The results of  this paper demonstrate that female credit program  participation has a statistically significant
negative effect on the likelihood that a respondent has  received family remittances.  Pitt and McKernan  (2000)  have
also shown that credit use causes a fall in  net remittances  from  relatives of program  participants to the participants.
23The last column of Table 5 imposes exogeneity wherever warranted by the Wu-Hausman tests
presented in Table 4. Table 6 presents estimates  without imposing exogeneity, when warranted,
in its second column. The results of these Wu-Hausman tests are indicated next to the parameter
estimates.
All variables  (factor 10)
Female credit had a positive and highly significant (t= 6.00) effect on the factor encompassing  all
the questions in the questionnaire (thus a representation of the "general level of empowerment")
and it had a significantly positive effect on nine out of the ten factors (the exception being the
factor representing power in family-planning  and child-rearing activities).  Female credit had a
positive and significant effect  on roughly half of the individual empowerment variables. Male
credit significantly reduced the overall empowerment  factor (t=-2.99), had a significant negative
effect on six of the other empowerment factors and did not have a positive effect on any of them.
Purchasing
Female credit use positively and significantly (t=3 .15)  affects the latent empowerment  factor
describing women's autonomy with purchasing.  In addition, female credit significantly augments
women's ability to purchase all seven questionnaire  items in this category.  Female credit also
increases the likelihood both that a husband states that his wife could buy assets on her own and
that she could buy them without his permission. In contrast, husbands credit program
participation has a statistically  significant (t=-3.55) negative effect on the women's purchasing
autonomy factor.
Resources
Female credit significantly (t=10.24) increases the latent factor representing a woman's  access to
and control over economic resources.  It also affects several individual indicators, including the
likelihood that a man says his wife has her own income, the likelihood that a wife reported
having her own income, and the likelihood of her reporting having her own savings (it did not,
incidentally,  affect the likelihood that a woman had savings which she herself could  control).  In
24addition, female  credit increases the likelihood that a woman responds that she would be able to
raise emergency funds from any source, and that she would be able to raise them specifically
from (1)  selling off assets, (2) getting money from her husband, and (3)  borrowing  from other
people. Female credit decreases  the chances that a household reports that it fights about money.
In contrast, male credit is significantly (t=-3.25) associated  with lower latent resource
empowerment,  and with reduced likelihood that wives have independent savings and access to
emergency  funds.
Finance
Women's credit significantly increases  (t=5.84) the latent empowerment  factor associated with
finance.  In contract, men's credit reduces this factor (t=-2.63).
Transaction  Management
Female credit significantly  (t=5. 11)  increases the  factor representing a woman's power to
oversee and conduct major household economic transactions, and male credit reduces  this factor
(t=-2.53). Data from the questionnaire  describes decision-making and implementation
arrangements  (ranging from full power in the wife's hands to full power in the husband's)  and
the likelihood that a wife spends money, for four major categories:  housing repair, livestock
purchase, household  loans, and land/equipment transactions.  In all four categories, female credit
affects women's autonomy regarding decision-making  and project implementation.  The same is
true for the likelihood that a woman  spends money in every category except land/equipment
transactions. Notably, the t-statistics for female credit effects on women's autonomy in deciding
and implementing  household finance decisions are especially  high. Male  credit had a negative
effect on wives  implementing housing repair projects, livestock purchase projects, and
land/equipment  purchase or sale projects.
Mobility and networks
Female  credit significantly (t=7.83) affects the factor representing mobility/networking  and also
affects  several individual measures of mobility, including the odds that a husband will report that
his wife travels alone outside the house, the odds that a woman reports traveling outside the
25house at all and that she reports traveling outside alone. It also has an effect in reducing the odds
that a household will argue about the wife traveling outside and also the odds that a husband will
cite a general ban on women  leaving the household  (as opposed to other reasons such as
perceived  lack of safety) as the reason his wife does not leave  the house. Female credit has a
positive effect on several  measures of women's physical mobility in the questionnaire  and the t-
statistics for these variables are remarkably  high. Male credit reduces the mobility and network
latent factor (t--4.22), the level of a wife's physical  mobility, and the likelihood that she ever
travels outside the house  (even if accompanied).
Activism
Female credit positively affects the factor relating to women's awareness  and activism  (t=3.20).
Female credit affects the odds that a woman will be informed of (meaning able to list) the ways
in which kabinnama (a pre-marital bridal contract) can be used to help a woman  in the event of
divorce. Female credit also affects the probability that a woman  knows the name of the Member
of Parliament in her area,  the probability that she voted in the last election, and the probability
that she voted independently (rather than under advice/pressure  from her husband).
Male credit reduces this factor, although not significantly (t-1.14), and reduces the
probability that his wife will vote independently.
Attitudes and husband's behavior
Female credit significantly (t=4.2 1) increases the factor relating to household attitudes and the
factor relating to husbands' opinions and actions (t=3.93).  Male credit has no significant effect
on either of these latent empowerment  factors. Female credit affects the likelihood that a man
will describe his wife as intelligent and the probability that a woman will say that she does not
view her husband as superior to herself.  In the questionnaire,  men were given the chance to cite
positive and/or negative impacts of women's empowerment.  Female credit increases the odds
that a man listed a positive impact of women's empowerment and decreases the odds that he a
negative impact.  Specifically,  female credit affects the odds that a man would cite the creation of
26a "better society" and "economic  improvements for the family" as results from women's
empowerment.
Male credit had a negative effect on the odds that a husband would say "My wife is
smarter than me" or that he would say "My wife is as intelligent as me." Male credit increased
the odds that a man would say "My wife is not as smart as me." While male credit had no effect
on the variable describing the general severity of spousal  arguments (ranging from mild
arguments to loud arguments to verbal abuse to physical  abuse), male credit did have a
significant effect (t=-2.15), which with our coding,  indicates that male credit increases the
occurrence  of physical  spousal abuse.
Family Planning  and Parenting  Issues
Women were asked whether they initiated discussion on a range of family planning and parenting
issues, and whether their husbands initiated  discussion (wife initiation and husband  initiation
were not mutually exclusive: answers could be one, the other, both, or neither).  Female credit
significantly (t=2.97) increases the fertility and parenting latent factor.  In contrast, male credit
significantly (t-2.38) reduces this factor.  Female credit increases the likelihood that a woman
initiates discussions with her husband about birth control use, birth control methods, and birth
numbers. In addition, female credit increases the likelihood both that husbands will initiate
discussion and that wives will initiate the same discussion for issues of birth control use and
children's education (implying a positive effect  on the total likelihood of spousal communication
on these two issues). Male credit had a negative  effect on both the odds that a wife initiated
discussion regarding birth control use with her husband and on the odds that she initiated
discussion about birth control methods.
Otlher results and discussion
Female  credit affects the chances that a woman has at least one close friend living outside her
bari (family compound) "with whom [she is] intimate enough to share [her] feelings."  In
addition,  female credit affects the frequency  with which women have contact with such friends
27(meaning they are  more likely to say they have daily contact and less likely to say that this
contact is only monthly).  However,  for friendships within the bari, female credit had no effect.
A possible explanation  for these findings has to do with the nature of intra-bari versus
extra-bari relationships.  One conjecture that explains this finding is that in the absence of credit
program participation, women  still tend to have friends within their baris  (85% of women in the
sample had such friends), and thus there is little room for credit program participation  to increase
the rate of friendships.  Typically, the members of a bari are related patrilineally:  a bari  frequently
consists of several brothers, their parents, and their wives and children. Thus, any given woman's
friendships within her bari are likely to be limited to those to whom she is related by marriage
(for example, a sister-in-law).
Friendship outside the bari is, in general, more rare, and thus credit program participation
can have a real  effect in increasing  the tendency for women to have extra-bari friends. Since
most women within a savings and lending group are typically  not from the same bari,
participation in a credit program  is likely to widen the scope of social contact for these women.
While  female credit had a very significant positive effect on the likelihood that a woman
had independent  savings, it did not have an effect  on the likelihood that a woman had savings
that she herself  could control. Unfortunately,  because of the way the question on the
questionnaire was phrased, we have no way of knowing who controlled this savings in cases
where the respondent herself did not.  It is possible, then, that a lack of respondents'  control over
their savings does not imply that the respondents'  husbands controlled the savings, but rather that
someone else (a third party) had control. This is plausible in the context of the credit programs  in
question, which require women  to make periodic  savings (thus, just as one would predict, highly
increasing the odds that a woman has her own savings) but which do not allow women complete
control over their savings.  This is because savings become working capital within credit groups
and are lent out to other members.  As a result, it is quite plausible  that a woman would have her
own savings as a result of joining a credit program, but would not have savings that she herself
(solely)  controls.
Female credit has a negative  effect on the odds that a woman reports having "received
money from parents/brothers/sisters  or other relatives  outside the household in last  12 months."
28These results  are in agreement with Pitt and McKernan's  (2000) evidence that net remittances
from participants in credit programs to their relatives (meaning the excess of remittance  from
participants to families over the remittance from families  to participants)  fall as a result of
program participation.  This result is actually not overly surprising, and should not necessarily  be
interpreted  as being "bad for empowerment."  Although receiving remittances  from her own
relatives can be financially  beneficial to a woman  (and thus "empowering"),  the need to accept
money from one's kin (rather than, say, earning it oneself)  may actually be a sign of a low degree
of command over economic resources.  Thus, the explanation for these results could be that
participation  in a credit program  allows a woman to earn her own income and thus reduce her
dependency on her own family in order to get money. When the story is told in this way, this
result  suggests an empowering  rather than a disempowering effect of credit.  It is also possible
that it is not women's  need for parental  remittances that declines as a result of credit program
participation,  but rather the willingness of the parents to remit money to the daughter.  Since we
do not have the necessary data to discern whether the decrease in kin remittances caused by
female credit are the result of decreased demand or decreased supply,  the result is best described
as "ambiguous"  in terms of its potential effects on women's empowerment or well-being.
Female credit use positively affects the chances that a woman  cited "household chores" as
a subject over which members of her household  argue. The question was phrased in such a way
that in order to answer the question, the respondent  had to pick one argument topic out of a list,
and "not arguing about anything"  was not an option. Thus, the female credit effect  on "arguing
about household chores"  is more appropriately  interpreted  as the effect on "arguing  about
household chores as opposed  to the other argument topics on the list ofpossibililies," and thus is
not an unambiguous  measure of empowerment.
7.  Summary
This paper examines the effects of men's and women's participation  in group-based  micro-credit
programs on various  indicators of women's empowerment using data from a special survey
carried out in rural Bangladesh  in 1998/99. The results are consistent with the view that women's
participation  in micro-credit programs helps to increase women's empowerment.  Credit program
29participation  leads to women taking a greater role in household decision  making, having greater
access to financial  and economic resources,  having greater social networks, having greater
bargaining  power vis-a-vis their husbands, and having greater freedom of mobility.  Female credit
also tended to increase spousal communication  in general about family planning and parenting
concerns. The effects of male credit on women's empowerment were,  at best, neutral and at
worst, decidedly  negative.  Male credit had a negative  effect on several  arenas of women's
empowerment,  including physical mobility, access to savings and economic resources, and power
to manage  some household transactions.
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32Table 1. Number of households  borrowing from credit programs, by gender of
borrower*
BRAC  BRDB  GB  ASA  PROSHIKA  GSS  Youth Dev.  Other NGO
Male  16  54  121  4  9  2  0  35
Female  273  72  545  105  29  3  1  183
* In some households, both  men  and women  borrowed. Also, some women borrowed  from  more than  one program
Table 2. Legend  for full text and coding of individual empowerment  variables
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked  of:
Food purchase  Do you buy the family's  daily consumable  Y=1, N=O  Wife
food items?
Cosmetics purchase  Do you buy toiletries and cosmetics for  Y=1, N=0  Wife
your own use?
Candy purchase  Do you buy ice-creams,  candies, or cookies  Y=1, N=O  Wife
for your children?
Utensils purchase  Do you buy utensils, pots and pans for the  Y=1, N=0  Wife
household?
Furniture purchase  Do you buy household  furniture?  Y=1, N=O  Wife
Children's clothing  purchase  Do you buy clothing  for your children?  Y=1, N=0  Wife
Own clothing purchase  Do you buy clothing for yourself?  Y= 1,  N=O  Wife
Wife  initiates discussion (birth  Do you initiate discussion of birth control  Y=1, N=0  Wife
control methods)  methods?
Husband initiates discussion  Does your husband initiate discussion of  Y=1, N=0  Wife
(birth control methods)  birth control  methods?
Wife initiates discussion (birth  Do you initiate discussion of birth control  Y=1,  N=0  Wife
control  use)  use?
Husband initiates discussion  Does your husband initiate  discussion of  Y=1, N=O  Wife
(birth control use)  birth control use?
Wife initiates discussion  (kids'  Do you initiate discussion of son's or  Y=1, N=0  Wife
marriage)  daughter's marriage?
Husband initiates discussion  Does your husband initiate discussion of  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
(kids' marriage)  son's or daughter's marriage?  I
33Table 2. Legend  for full text and coding of individual empowerment variables (continued)
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked of:
Wife initiates discussion  Do you initiate discussion of children's  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
(children's  education)  education?  _
Husband  initiates discussion  Does your husband initiate  discussion of  Y= 1,  N=O  Wife
(children's  education)  children's education?
Wife  initiates discussion (birth  Do you initiate discussion  of birth timing?  Y=1, N=O  Wife
timing)
Husband initiates discussion  Does your husband  initiate discussion of  Y=1, N=O  Wife
(birth timing)  birth timing?
Wife initiates discussion (birth  Do you initiate discussion of birth  Y=l, N=O  Wife
numbers)  numbers?
Husband initiates discussion  Does your husband initiate  discussion of  Y=1, N=O  Wife
(birth numbers)  birth numbers?
House repair decision  Who decides issues of repair/construction  Husband  Wife




House repair implementation  Who implements issues of repair/  Wife
construction of the house?
House repair spending  Do you spend on repair/construction  of the  Y=1, N=O  Wife
house?





Livestock purchase  Who implements  issues of sale/purchase of  Wife
implementation  livestock?
Livestock spending  Do you spend on sale/purchase of  Y=1, N=O  Wife
livestock?





Household loans  Who implements  issues of borrowing  Wife
implementation  money?
34Table 2. Legend for full text and coding of individual empowerment  variables (continued)
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked of:
Household loans spending  Do you spend on issues of borrowing  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
money?
Land/equipment  decision  Who decides issues of  H  Htibaff.d  -v '  Wife
sale/purchase/mortgage  of land/transport or,  alon  O  ..
household equipment/irrigation  'Hus1and&a6d
equipment?  wife together771J'
Wife alone=2".,
Land/equipment  Who implements issues of sale/purchase/mortgage  of  Wife
implementation  land/transport  or household equipment/irrigation
equipment??
Land/equipment  spending  Do you spend on issues of  Y=l, N=O  Wife
sale/purchase/mortgage  of land/transport or
household  equipment/irrigation
equipment?
Husband says wife  is  Do you think that your wife is as intelligent  Husband
intelligent  as you are?  "'S  ,
'>20Mor,e  7-,*y
Wife can buy an asset  Do you think your wife can take decisions  Y=l, N=O  Husband
in selling/buying of major household
assets?
Wife can buy an asset (without  Can your wife buy any asset on her own  Y=1,  N=O  Husband
husband's permission)  without your permission?
Wife has own income  Does your wife have her own income?  Y=1, N=O  Husband
Husband spends wife's loan  If your wife has a small loan, do you (or  Y-o  0  N 1  Husband
money  have you) spend  (spent) that yourself in  -
any  income generating activities?  R  _
Husband says wife travels  Does your wife go to market/bank/doctor's  Y=1, N=O  Husband
alone  chambers,  and so on alone?  If not...
Reason:  women not allowed  ...  why? Because  women are not allowed  ;  y- 4dN.-Y  Th  3JHusband
outside  to go  outside?  ,  ,  -
Reason:  lack of safety  ...  why? Because of lack of safety?  Y=1,  N=O  Husband
Reason:  wife goes with  ...  why? Because  she goes with husband  or  Y=1,  N=O  Husband
husband/son  son?
Reason: wife goes with  ...  why? Because  she goes with a neighbor  Y=l,  N=O  Husband
neighbor  or relative?
Wife  has independent  income  Do you have your own income, which you  Y=1, N=O  Wife
can spend without your husband's
permission?
Wife has independent  savings  Do you have your own savings?  Y=l, N=O  Wife
35Table 2. Legend for full text and coding of individual empowerment variables (continuedl
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked of:
Wife has independent  savings  Do you have your own savings which you  Y=1, N=O  Wife
which she herself controls  can decide how to utilize?
Emergency  funds access  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1, N=O  Wife
could you get it (from any  source)?
Emergency funds access (asset  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1, N=O  Wife
sale)  could you get it by selling own assets?
Emergency funds access (from  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1, N=O  Wife
husband)  could you get it from your husband?
Emergency funds access  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1, N=O  Wife
(husband's relatives)  could you get it by borrowing from your
husband's relatives?
Emergency  funds access (own  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
relatives)  could you get it by borrowing  from your
own relatives?
Emergency  funds access  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
(moneylenders)  could you get it by borrowing from
moneylenders?
Emergency funds access (other  If you needed 500 taka in an emergency,  Y=1, N=O  Wife
people)  could you get it by borrowing  from other
people?
Wife's control over loans  If you have income generating loans  in  Husband  Wife







Remittance  Have you received  money from  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
parents/brothers/sisters  or other relatives
outside the household  in the last 12
months?
Wife can decide how to use  Can you decide yourself how to use that  N=O,  Wife
remittance  remittance?  Partially=l,
Y=2
Money seizure by husband  Has your husband ever compelled you to  Y=O, N=1  Wife
give him money/asset if you don't want to?
36Table 2. Legend for full text and coding of individual empower ment variables  continued)
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked of:
Freedom to remit  Can you give away your money/asset at  Y=1, N=O  Wife
will to somebody?
Husband forbids work outside  Has your husband  ever forced you not to  ;  Wife
home  work outside home even if you want to?  7v' 
Visits relatives (without  Have you ever visited your parents or other  Y=1, N=O  Wife
husband's permission)  relatives  without your husband's
permission?
Marriage has kabinnama  Does your marriage have any kabinnama  Y=l, N=O  Wife
(prenuptial  bride price agreement)?
Awareness of kabinnama  Can kabinnama help a woman  in the event  Y=1, N=O  Wife
of a divorce?
Awareness of inheritance laws  Can a widow establish her legal claim over  Y=l, N=O  Wife
her dead husband's property?
Has prevented husband  Have you ever been successful  in stopping  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
remarrying  your husband from remarrying?
Voted (at all)  Did you vote in the last election?  Y=1, N=O  Wife
Voted  independently  Did you vote  in the last election without  Y= 1,  N=O  Wife
your husband telling you who to vote for?
Protested against domestic  Did you ever protest against any incidents  Y=1, N=O  Wife
abuse  of wife-beating?
Thinks dowry is good  Do you think dowry is good?  5V  .i5  Wife
Protested against corruption  Did you ever protest against any favoritism  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
by a chairman or a member who distributes
government relief?
Confidant within bari  With anybody outside your immediate  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
family/household,  but within your bari, are
you close enough to share your feelings?
Interval of contact within bari  With anybody outside your immediate  i1@nMth1y-.r`  '-  Wife
family/household,  but within your bari,  ekly=  I
how often do you interact with this person?  '.h  ily2  .
Confidant outside bari  With anybody outside your bari, are you  Y=1, N=O  Wife
close enough to share your feelings?
Interval of contact outside bari  With anybody  outside  y our bari,  how often  . Monthlh  O.-  - 'ife
do you interact  %  ith this  person'  ,WeekIvl,
r,,,.,.'  Daily  -9-
37Table 2. Legend  for f  1l text and coding of individual empowerment  variables (  ontinued)
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked  of:
Severity of spousal arguments  When you and your husband argue, how  Ph-al-  Wife
bad does the argument get?  abuse-0,Ver-bal
abuse  --,  'Loud
arguments=2 
Mlild
A  rgum,  3-=,nti
Occurrence  of physical spousal  When you and your husband argue,  does  Y7-  Wife
abuse  physical abuse occur?  ____._
Own relatives in same village  Do your parents or any sibling live in the  Y=1, N=0  Wife
same village as you do with your husband?
Wife thinks husband is  Is your husband superior to you in qualities  Y=0,.N=I  Wife
superior  and education?  ;  __,
Husband uses male birth  Do you yourself use any male birth control  Y=1, N=0  Husband
control  method?
Husband says women's  Does women's empowerment  lead to a  Y=1,  N=0  Husband
empowerment leads to better  better society?
society
Husband says  women's  Does women's empowerment  lead to chaos  Y=0, N=1  Husband
empowerment  leads to chaos  in society?
in society  , .
Husband says women's  Does women's empowerment lead to  Y=Q, N-1.  Husband
empowerment  leads to  problems  bringing up the children?
problems with kids  .
Husband says women's  Does women's empowerment  lead to loss  'Y=  N='I'  Husband
empowerment  leads to loss of  of family peace?
peace  -;,;_____
Husband says women's  Does women's empowerment lead to the  Y=1,  N=0  Husband
empowerment leads to better  family being better off economically?
economically
Husband cites positive impact  Does women's empowerment  have a good  Y= 1,  N=0  Husband
of women's empowerment  impact?
Husband cites negative  impact  Does women's empowerment have a bad  Y#  NI  Husband
of women's empowerment  impact?  .___________
Husband's assessment of  What is your general assessment of  ? :1y  Husband
women's empowerment  women's empowerment  g
posi,tt.ve:  2.
Husband views lack of  Is  lack of education  an obstacle to women's  Y= 1, N=0  Husband
education  as obstacle  empowerment?
38Table 2. Legend for full text and coding  of individual empowerment variables  continued
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked of:
Husband  views  lack of safety  Is lack of safety an obstacle to women's  Y=1, N=O  Husband
as obstacle  empowerment?
Husband views lack of IGA as  Is lack of Income Generating Activities an  Y=1, N=O  Husband
obstacle  obstacle to women's empowerment?
Husband  views social structure  Is the social structure an obstacle  to  Y=l, N=O  Husband
as obstacle  women's empowerment?
Husband views law as obstacle  Is inheritance law an obstacle to women's  Y=1, N=O  Husband
empowerment?
Wife has made husband  use  Have you ever succeeded  in making your  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
birth control  husband adopt a male birth-control
method?
Wife has Income Generating  Do you have any Income  Generating  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
Activity  Activity?
Wife has Income Generating  Do you have any Income  Generating  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
Activity which she herself  Activity which you yourself operate?
operates
Degree of mobility  How do you go to banks, markets,  health  ,Doesn'tgoat  Wife
centers or places outside the village  all-O, Goes w'ith




Wife  ever travels  Do you ever go to these places at all?  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
Wife ever travels alone  Do you ever go to these places alone?  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
Prevent remarriage  (threaten  How can  a wife prevent her husband  from  Y= 1, N=O  Wife
divorce)  remarrying .. .by threatening divorce?
Prevent remarriage (family  How can a wife prevent her husband from  Y=1, N=O  Wife
pressure)  remarrying ... by creating family pressure?
Prevent remarriage (local govt)  How can a wife prevent her husband from  Y=1, N=O  Wife
remarrying... by pressing change  in the
local administration?
Prevent remarriage (parishad)  How can a wife prevent her husband  from  Y=l, N=O  Wife
remarrying...  by pressing change in the
Union Parishad?
Prevent remarriage  (deny  How can a wife prevent her husband from  Y= 1,  N=O  Wife
permission)  remarrying ... By not giving permission?
39Table 2. Legend  for full text and coding  of individual empowerment variables (continued
Name of variable  Full text from questionnaire  Coding*  Asked  of:
Household fights about kids  Does your household  argue about the  Y=O, N=l  Wife
children?  .
Household  fights about money  Does your household argue about money?  Y=O, N=1  Wife
Household fights about in-laws  Does your household argue about your in-  Y=O, N=1  Wife
laws?
Household fights about going  Does your household argue about going  Y=O, N-1  Wife
outside  outside?  :
Household fights about loans  Does your household argue about loans?  Y-=O,  N=1  Wife
Household fights about chores  Does your household argue about  Y=O, N=1  Wife
household chores?
Wife views lack of ed as  Is lack of education  an obstacle to women's  Y=l, N=O  Wife
obstace  empowerment?
Wife  views lack of safety as  Is lack of safety an obstacle to women's  Y=1, N=O  Wife
obstacle  empowerment?
Wife views lack of jobs as  Is lack of  jobs an obstacle to women's  Y=1, N=O  Wife
obstacle  empowerment?
Wife views social structure  as  Is the social structure an obstacle to  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
obstacle  women's empowerment?
Wife views laws as obstacle  Is inheritance  law an obstacle  to women's  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
empowerment?
Wife views  religion as obstacle  Is religion an obstacle to women's  Y=1,  N=O  Wife
lempowerment?  I_  I
*Most variables are coded with  O=No and  l=Yes. Those  variables which are coded differently  are  shaded.
40Table 3. Factor analysis  components  and statistics
Factor 1: Purchasing  Eigenvalue:  3.51571
Ability to spend nmoney independently and  to mnake household  purchases
Component Variable  IFactor Loading  jUniqueness
Food purchase  0.47093  0.77823
Cosmetics purchase  0.44616  0.80094
Candy purchase  0.33099  0.89045
Utensils purchase  0.32841  0.89214
Furniture purchase  0.40664  0.83464
Children's clothing purchase  0.44740  0.79983
Own clothing puchase  0.42120  0.82259
House repair spending  0.78301  0.38689
Livestock  spending  0.68433  0.53169
Household loans spending  0.59525  0.64568
Land/equipment  spending  0.77725  0.39589
Wife can buy an asset  0.33546  0.88747
Wife can buy an asset (without  0.42678  0.81786
husband's permission)
Factor 2: Resources  Eigenvalue:  1.90442
General  economic power and access to funds
Component Variable  |Factor Loading  [Uniqueness
Wife has own income  0.71615  0.48713
Independent  income  0.71341  0.49105
Independent  savings  0.38232  0.85383
Emergency funds access  0.25763  0.93363
Emergency funds access (asset sale)  0.27284  0.92556
Has independent IGA  0.69996  0.51005
Remittance  0.07094  0.99497
Money seizure by husband  0.05176  0.99732
Freedom  to remit  0.31299  0.90203
41Table 3. Factor analysis components and statistics (continued)
Factor 3: Finance  Eigenvalue:  1.00728
Power regarding  household borrowing and ability to borrow  from informal  sources
IComponent Variable  jFactor Loading  jUniqueness  I
Household  loans decision  0.63768  0.59336
Household  loans implementation  0.64487  0.58414
Household loans spending  0.37709  0.8578
Emergency  funds access (husband's  0.03309  0.9989
relatives)
Emergency funds access (own relatives)  0.05422  0.99706
Emergency funds access (moneylenders)  0.04844  0.99765
Emergency funds access (other people)  0.28783  0.96472
Household  fights about loans  0.03039  0.99908
Factor 4: Transaction  Management  Eigenvalue:  4.60413
Balance ofpower relating to decision, implelnentation, and spending  for household
transactions
IComponent Variable  |Factor Loading  jUniqueness  l
House repair decision  0.70035  0.50952
House repair implementation  0.61364  0.62345
House repair spending  0.53234  0.71662
Livestock purchase decision  0.71466  0.48926
Livestock purchase implementation  0.64324  0.58625
Livestock spending  0.46068  0.78778
Household loans decision  0.70648  0.50088
Household  loans implementation  0.66957  0.55167
Household loans spending  0.42276  0.82128
Land/equipment decision  0.6637  0.5595
Land/equipment implementation  0.69162  0.52167
Land/equipment spending  0.52152  0.72802
42Table 3. Factor analysis components  and statistics (continued)
Factor 5: Mobility and Networks  Eigenvalue:  1.05988
Freedom of movement,  develop7ment of networks, relalionships with blood kin and in-laws
Component Variable  IFactor Loading  Uniqueness  L
Husband says wife travels alone  0.64691  0.58151
Emergency funds access (husband's relatives)  0.01562  0.9976
Emergency  funds access (own relatives)  0.11682  0.98635
Emergency funds access (other people)  0.09009  0.99188
Degree of mobility  0.63217  0.60036
Remittance  0.0976  0.99047
Visits relatives without permission  0.3588  0.87126
Confidant within bari  0.01468  0.99978
Confidant outside bari  0.14334  0.97945
Own relatives in same village  0.2464 1  0.93928
Factor 6: Activism  Eigenvalue:  .80907
Awareness of  law and politics, autonouts  action on public and  private matters
Component Variable  |Factor Loading  jUniqueness
Marriage has kabinnama  0.2943  0.91339
Awareness of kabinnama  0.36751  0.86494
Awareness of inheritance  laws  0.33478  0.88792
Prevent remarriage  (local govt)  0.08528  0.99273
Prevent remarriage  (parishad)  0.11016  0.98786
Has prevented husband remarrying  0.18111  0.9672
Knows MP's name  0.38016  0.85548
Voted (at all)  0.27893  0.9222
Voted independently  0.20425  0.95828
Protested against domestic abuse  0.25028  0.93736
Thinks dowry is good  0.13026  0.98303
Protested against corruption  0.20753  0.95693
Views social  structure as obstacle  0.18723  0.96494
Views laws as obstacle  0.02443  0.9994
Views religion as obstacle  0.02703  0.99927
43Table 3. Factor analysis components and statistics (continued)
Factor 7: Household  Attitudes  Eigenvalue:  2.22182
Attitudes on wonien's enmpowerment, dowry, and status within household
lcomponent  Variable  lIFactor Loading  jUniqueness  l
Thinks dowry is good  0.03584  0.99872
Wife thinks husband is superior  0.14373  0.97934
Husband says wife is intelligent  0.18998  0.96391
Husband says wife can make decisions  0.16573  0.97253
Husband says w.e.=better society  0.82516  0.31911
Husband says w.e.chaos  in society  0.77915  0.39292
Husband says w.e.=problems with kids  0.24824  0.93838
Husband says w.e.=loss of peace  0.52887  0.72029
Husband  says w.e.=better economically  0.71205  0.49298
Factor 8: Husband's Behavior  Eigenvalue:  1.60615
Husband's  actions and opinions pertaining  to wonmen's status
Component Variable  lFactor Loading jUniqueness
Husband says wife is intelligent  0.24312  0.94089
Husband says wife can make decisions  0.20698  0.95716
Husband cites positive impact of w.e.  0.84668  0.28313
Husband cites negative  impact of w.e.  0.86215  0.2567
Emergency funds access (from husband)  0.0237  0.99944
Husband confiscates money  -0.11345  0.98713
Husband forbids work outside home  -0.17274  0.97016
Degree of spousal abuse  0.02765  0.99924
44Table 3. Factor analysis  components  and statistics (continued)
Factor 9: Fertility and Parenting  Eigenvalue:  2.62338
Decisions and action forfamily planning and child-rearing
Component Variable  Factor Loading  Uniqueness
Candy purchase  0.07674  0.98991
Children's clothing purchase  0.077  0.9838
Initiates discussion (birth control  methods)  0.84  0.28867
Initiates  discussion (birth control use)  0.87054  0.23427
Initiates discussion (children's education)  0.32892  0.87778
Initiates discussion (birth timing)  0.69096  0.52243
Initiates discussion (birth numbers)  0.71566  0.48526
Husband uses male birth control  0.15726  0.48812
Wife has made husb use birth control  0.16003  0.48499
Factor 10: All Variables  Eigenvalue:  9.08115
Thisfactor could be referred to loosely as "general  women's empowerment"
This factor could be referred  to loosely as "general  women's
empowerment"
45Table 4. Wu Tests for Exogenei  y  of Female and Male Credit Variables
Factor  Test for female  Test for male  Test for joinit  Appropriate modeg
credit  credit  exogeneity
exogeneity  exogeneity
Purchasing  t = -0.210  t = -0.480  F =0.350  Exogenous  female credit
P-val = 0.835  P-val = 0.632  P-val = 0.7016  Exogenous male credit
Resources  t = 0.600  t = -2.250  F =2.760  Exogenous female  credit
P-val = 0.552  P-val = 0.024  P-val = 0.0634  Endogenous male credit
Finance  t = -1.270  t = -1.390  F =3.930  Endogenousfemale credit
P-val = 0.205  P-val  = 0.164  P-val = 0.0198  Endogenous male credit
Transaction  t = -1.260  t = -1.450  F =4.800  Endogenousfemale credit
P-val = 0.207  P-val = 0.147  P-val = 0.0083  Endogenous male credit
Mobility and  t = 0.760  t = -0.790  F =0.390  Exogenous female credit
networks  P-val = 0.446  P-val = 0.431  P-val = 0.6783  Exogenous male credit
Activism  t = 0.870  t = -0.180  F =0.420  Exogenous female credit
P-val = 0.382  P-val  = 0.859  P-val = 0.6569  Exogenous male credit
Household  t = -0.940  t = -0.580  F =1.000  Exogenous female credit
attitudes  P-val]= 0.346  P-val = 0.559  P-val  =  0.3686  Exogenous male credit
Husband's  t = -1.030  t = -0.030  F =0.580  Exogenous  female credit
behavior  P-val = 0.302  P-val = 0.975  P-val = 0.5604  Exogenous male credit
Fertility and  t = 0.590  t =  1.870  F =3.300  Endogenousfemale  credit
parenting  P-val = 0.553  P-val = 0.062  P-val = 0.0371  Endogenous male credit
All Variables  t = 0.270  t = -0.820  F =0.330  Exogenous female credit
P-val = 0.791  P-val = 0.415  P-val = 0.7160  Exogenous  male credit
Table 5. Male and femrale effects on factors
Factor  Female/male credit  NaYve estimate I  Naive estimate 2  Appropriate
No fixed effects  Village fixed effects  estimate
No instrumental  No instrumental
variables  variables
Factor 1:  Female credit  0.0788  0.0744
Purchasing  (3.20)  (3.15)
Male credit  -0.0222  -0.0287
(-2.48)  (-3.55)
Factor 2:  Female credit  0.1202  .1301  .1060
Resources  (7.97)  (10.24)  (6.31)
Male credit  -.0177  -.0301  .0163
(-1.74)  (-3.25)  (0.69)
46Table 5. Male  and female  effects  on  factors (continued)
Factor  Female/male  credit  Nafve  estimate 1  Naive estimate 2  Appropriate
No fixed effects  Village  fixed effects  estimate
No instrumental  No instrumental
variables  variables
Factor 3:  Female credit  .1003  .0752  .1098
Finance  . (7.59)  (5.84)  (3.26)
Male credit  -.0189  -.0206  .00047
(-2.28)  (-2.63)  (0.21)
Factor 4:  Female credit  .1163  .0917  .1379
Transaction  (6.12)  (5.11)  (3.09)
management  Male credit  -.0238  -.0247  .0035
(-2.56)  (-2.53)  (0.14)
Factor 5:  Female credit  .0991  .1028
Mobility and  (7.12)  (7.83)
networks  Male credit  -.0309  -.0372
(-3.34)  (-4.22)
Factor 6:  Female credit  .0618  .0376
Activism  (4.95)  (3.20)
Male credit  -.0119  -.0094
(-1.33)  (-1.35)
Factor 7:  Female credit  .0526  .0639
Household  (3.20)  (4.21)
attitudes  Male credit  .0004  -.0034
(0.04)  (-0.35)
Factor 8:  Female credit  .0546  .0601
Husband's  (3.25)  (3.93)
behavior  Male credit  -.0071  -.0116
(-0.65)  (-1.14)
Factor 9:  Female credit  .0552  .0488  .0178
Fertility an d  (3.20)  (2.97)  (0.38)
parenting  Male credit  -.0225  -.0252  -.0668
(-2.27)  (-2.38)  (-2.17)
Factor  10:  Female credit  .1284  .1165
All variables  (5.45)  (6.00)
-.0308  -.0446
(-1.78)  (-2.99)
47Table 6. Male and Female Credit Effects  on Individual Empowerment Questions
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous  credit model  Appropriate  model
credit
Food  purchase  Female  credit  .04776041  (2.20323 17)
Male credit  .00 14 1  589 ( 11540183)
Cosmetics  purchase  Female credit  05860924  (3.0890573)
Male credit  -.00085887(-.07842965)
Candy purchase  Female  credit  .06361531  (33796502)
Male credit  .00238608 (.21357556)
Utensils purchase  Female credit  .06462877 (3 3973055)
Male credit  -.01015248(-.91474276)
Fumiture  purchase  Female credit  .11399304  (3.3408784)  .09450988(2.7854132)a
Male credit  -04055258(-1.7362839)  .10037581  ( 78000203)a
Children's clothing  Female credit  .06593455 (3 0208841)  .06310113 (2  9080015) a
purchase  Male credit  -.0  1710887(-1.3094382)  -.06799148(-.96363801)  a
Own clothing  Female credit  .06782688 (3.2403093)  05868075  (2 8275366)a
purchase  Male credit  - 0324938  (-2.541223)  -.07790267(-1.2072677)'
Wife initiates  Female  credit  .0912055  (4 3732557)
discussion (birth  Male credit  -.03085828(-2.4979816)
control  methods)
Husband  initiates  Female credit  02865999 (1.5042031)
discussion (birth  Male credit  01073733 (92167669)
control methods)
Wife initiates  Female  credit  .12275242 (56980881)
discussion (birth  Male credit  -.04567825(-3.6508717)
control  use)
Husband initiates  Female  credit  .06501086 (3 3148577)
discussion (birth  Male credit  00328392 (.27138652)
control use)
Wife  initiates  Female credit  0733686  (3.0038177)  .12523773  (1.0536146)C
discussion (kids'  Male credit  -01647947(- 1.1171852)  -.07355644(-.59684847) c
marriage)
Husband initiates  Female  credit  .05491004 (2.2773254)
discussion (kids'  Male credit  -.01561035(-1.0662414)
marriage)
Wife initiates  Female  credit  .12380831  (52159512)  .11924787  (5.1578818)a
discussion (children's  Male credit  -00700765(-.47441271)  .02058241  (.25726957)h
education)
Husband initiates  Female  credit  .14298343 (6.100405)  .1306935  (5.7529255)8
discussion (children's  Male credit  -.0191 1873(-1  3296468)  .05740227  (.71737438)8
education)  . .
Wife initiates  Female credit  .01643459  (.83961744)  .00608107  (.06797522)a
discussion (birth  Male credit  .00820515  (.68634246)  -.02811081(-.31096221)'
timing)
Husband initiates  Female  credit  .03155623  (i  6648596)  .04205182  (2.2494966)a
discussion (birth  Male credit  02181647  (1.8607394)  -.00796965(-.12990483)a
timing)
Wife initiates  Fernale credit  .082935 12  (4.0749984)  .08064387  (4.0464672)e
discussion (birth  Male credit  -.0060319 (-.49479264)  -00941715(-.15586521)a
numbers)
48Table 6. Male and female  credit effects  on individual empowerment questions (continued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Husband initiates  Female credit  08366957 (4.298626)  .0851692  (4  4497355)a
discussion (birth  Male credit  .01287064  (1.0768375)  .06302056 (1.076337)a
numbers)
House repair decision  Female credit  .08907876  (4.2620781)
Male credit  - 00975032(-.78694676)
House repair  Female credit  07207265 (33856953)  05257216 (2  5858211)a
implementation  Male credit  - 05098127(-4.2001659)  -.14109895(-2  0796276)a
House repair spending  Female credit  13213097 (2.2869854)
Male credit  -.02265464(-i.044386)
Livestock purchase  Female credit  .12567333 (5  7735449)  .2069053  (3.4762615)b
decision  Male credit  - 01387871(-I  087525)  00368387 ( 30 344242) b
Livestock purchase  Female  credit  06872113  (3.5365616)  .23198282 (2  7099889)
implementation  Male credit  -.03405356(-2.9825091)  -.20707802(-2.4045442)C
Livestock spending  Female  credit  11883032 (2  4274332)  .10569635 (2 1319242)a
Male  credit  - 00371256(- 20287309)  -.15139041(- 86006726)a
Household loans  Female credit  16210609 (7.6887465)  .13218476 (6  5662884)8
decision  Male credit  -.04490973(-3  8469249)  .03424304 (.59350472)8
Household  loans  Female  credit  14057259 (7 1552867)  11475915 (6.0827791)8
implementation  Male credit  - 06104301(-5.4802638)  .1  1736821(-1.9679329) a
Household loans  Female  credit  .12991344 (3  3276476)  .12176248 (3.067932)a
spending  Male credit  - 08472108(-2 2018748)  -.1  7656793(- 1.1678715) a
Land/equipment  Female  credit  12638888 (6.2372212)  .17103918 (2  008231 1)'
decision  Male  credit  -.02497008(-2.1609634)  03367202  (.40901592) C
Land/equipment  Female  credit  09766105  (5.1815832)  .24828216  (2.8976129)'
implementation  Male credit  -.03660103(-3.3099373)  - 22945787(-2.7228374)C
Land/equipment  Female  credit  .08693242 (I 5483862)
spending  Male credit  - 03123732(-  76965112)
Husband says wife is  Female  credit  09782371 (5.1313304)
intelligent  Male credit  -.0359709 (-3.1449831)
Wife can  buy an asset  Female credit  .07018261 (3  3838999)
Male credit  -.0128851  (-  I 0876201)
Wife can  buy an  asset  Female credit  .06747569 (2  8552021)
(without husband's  Male credit  -.00803558(-  60671635)
permission)
Wife has own income  Female  credit  12659167 (6.4359697)
Male credit  -.01 102797(-  99794156)
Husband  spends  Female credit  - 35438 (-9.711638)  -4.8942583  (-  1.2032126)C
wife's  loan money  Male credit  -.01802366 (-.68702186)  79614351  (.66056197)c
49Table 6. Male and female credit effects  on individual em  owerment questions (continued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Husband  says wife  Female credit  .12570957 (5.7274842)
travels alone  Male credit  -.01651619(- 1.3198174)
Wife  has independent  Female  credit  08544579 (4.1829839)  .07855306  (3.9046027)'
income  Male credit  - 00230439(-.201  17939)  .07392437  (1.2128377)a
Wife has independent  Female  credit  .4468341  (21  264715)  .55937315 (8.1383188)b
savings  Male credit  - 1220153 (-10.70441)  -05553827(-5.2213782)"
Wife has  independent  Female credit  04887458  (I  6630768)
savings which she  Male credit  00488506 ( 29625473)
herself controls
Emergency funds  Female  credit  17599848 (8 84399S7)
access  Male credit  -.04927985(-4.3592823)
Emergency funds  Female credit  .15163642 (3 7263403)
access (asset  sale)  Male credit  -05101663(-2.0145894)
Emergency  funds  Female  credit  .05816154 (2.7675279)
access (from  husband)  Male credit  .00836456 (.69821613)
Emergency funds  Female  credit  .11225464 (5  3892888)  -.07767567(-.86277973)c
access (husband's  Male credit  -.02625655(-2  1466454)  00908476(  10431222)'
relatives)  l
Emergency funds  Female credit  -.0035531  (-. 1701666 i6)
access (own  relatives)  Male credit  -.02508447(-2.0300173)
Emergency  funds  Female credit  -.03 163719(-.65054464)
access (moneylenders)  Male credit  01068736 (.36908294)
Emergency funds  Female credit  .08425008 (2.4472459)
access (other people)  Male credit  -00779705(-  37519001)
Wife's control over  Female  credit  -.01703254 (- 60133783)  -.01808199 (-.63718212)a
loans  Male credit  -0205718  (-1.1283077)  -.04399091  (-.61355432)a
Remittance  Female  credit  -.05035626(-2  1274473)
Male credit  00549734 (.41368397)
Wife can  decide how  Female credit  -.02334331  (-.36612289)
to use remittance  Male credit  .01616041 (.43267576)
Money seizure by  Female credit  -.01399654(-.68291502)
husband  Male credit  01176347 (I 0159i57)
Freedom to remit  Female credit  07680612 (3.554106)  .1398961  (1.4727807)  '
Male credit  -01941725(- 1.596456)  -.0340874 (-.39708405) C
Husband forbids work  Female credit  -.08583542(-4.4739977)  -.  13334304(  1.5430302)c
outside home  Male credit  .03820209 (3.3884507)  .10593927  (1.2860949)
50Table 6. Male and female credit effects  on individual  em  owerment questions (continued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Visits relatives  Female  credit  01911277 (91810268)
(without husband's  Male credit  -04657823(-3.3794914)
permission)
Marriage  has  Female  credit  02275705  (1.1305345)
kabinnarna  Male credit  -00044701(-.03591271)
Awareness of  Female credit  05771666 (1 8559487)  06718893  (2.2116211)  a
kabinnama  Male credit  .0066104  (33847749)  -08635385(-.89016727)a
Awareness  of  Female credit  .02878196 (.91363229)  .0196325  (.64003634) a
inheritance laws  Male credit  -.01984606(-1  0841944)  -.01026009(-.09996157)a
Has prevented  Female credit  .00728302 (19819264)
husband remarrying  Male credit  00616823  (.29205465)
Knows MP's name  Female credit  .08391138 (4.3870888)
Male  credit  -00768854(- 68322894)
Voted  (at all)  Female credit  13131678  (5  1633827)
Male credit  -.00194159(-.12746871)
Voted  independently  Female credit  .0414437  (2.0471695)
Male credit  -.02997352(-2.383433 1)
Protested against  Female credit  .03678351  (I 8633071)
domestic abuse  Male  credit  .01 145688  (1.027746)
Thinks dowry isgood  Female  credit  .01067717  (51269369)
Male credit  00030867  (.02543997)
Protested against  Female credit  04417861  (1.2452415)  .20041202  (1.256096) b
corruption  Male credit  -00056154(-.02879464)  00308572 (.16340061)
Confidant within bar,  Female credit  03205397(-1.4444465)  -.03157462(-1.4481029) b
Male credit  00007672  (.00579186)  -.00698016(-  0944099)  b
Interval of  contact  Female credit  -03091528 (-  1.3888953)
within bari  Male  credit  -.00121859  (- 09191732)
Confidant outside bari  Female credit  .06783766 (3 4223935)  .07555079  (3  887994)
Male  credit  .01653874 (I 3  14044)  00009649 ( 00159348)
Interval of  contact  Female credit  07150086 (3.6184072)
outside bar,  Male  credit  01697922  (1.3522985)
Severity of spousal  Female  credit  -.0394947 (- I 6873243)
arguments  Male  credit  .01730603  (1.2730856)
Occurrence of  Female  credit  -.03443847  (-1.5268851)  .11238656  (.99327696)C
physical spousal abuse  Male credit  .00547143  (.429073 11)  -.24067036 (-2  1450465) c
Own relatives in same  Female credit  08333928  (4.0508622)  -.05111895(-.80978534)b
village  Male credit  -.06561099(-4  6359715)  -.05101128(-3  6 65 784 8)tb
51Table 6. Male and female credit effects on individual emj owerment questions  (conti  ued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Wife thinks husband  Female  credit  .1450791  (4.872342)
is  superior  Male credit  -.01446311 (- 87795812)
Husband  uses male  Female credit  .02956166 (.93340601)
birth control  Male credit  - 00821234(-.44513926)
Reason = women  not  Female credit  14900052 (5.0660569)
allowed outside  Male credit  -.02041713(- 1.1715493)
Reason = lack of  Female credit  -.06532019(-2 328394)
safety  Male credit  - 00085579(- 05026752)
Reason = wife goes  Female credit  .00564198 ( 27281459)
with husband/son  Male credit  .03149786 (2  5582753)
Reason = wife goes  Female credit  14400445 (6.1232355)
with  neighbor  Male credit  -.06842666(-4.468412)
Husband says  Female credit  .05421608 (2.7797372)
w e  =better society  Male credit  -.01704432(- i 5155241)
Husband says  Female credit  .03310243 (I 7129112)
w.e.=chaos  in  society  Male credit  - 00927146(-.826341,47)
Husband says  Female credit  .02226409 (I 073948)
w e.=problems  with  Male credit  -.01075105(-.88421994)
kids
Husband says  Female credit  0175682  (88853243)
w e  =loss of  peace  Male credit  -.00413204(-  36055211)
l
Husband  says  Female  credit  .04666237 (2.3018i'61)
w.e.=better  Male credit  -.00193728(-.16867565)
economically
Husband cites positive  Female credit  .04462788 (2.305!  181)
impact of  w.e  Male credit  - 02053908(- 1.8382332)
Husband cites  Female credit  .05758083  (2.934983 1)
negative  impact of  Male credit  -.00996125(-  88881097)
we.
Husband's  assessment  Female credit  .04144622 (2.1361352)
ofw e  Male credit  -.01981529(-1.7648085)
Husband views lack of Female credit  .00169411 (.09063681)  1046509  (I 7900802) b
education as obstacle  Male credit  .00593213 ( 54870205)  .00352775 ( 33895392)b
Husband views lackof Female credit  - 01163518(- 6298988)  -.04936265(-.59179858)c
safety as obstacle  Male credit  -.01664214(-l  5188646)  04716903 ( 58875338)'
52Table 6. Male  and female credit effects  on individual  em  owerment questions (continued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous  credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Husband views lack of Female credit  06036897  (2.8999283)  07183463  (3 5440582)a
IGA as obstacle  Male credit  02357819 (2 0845775)  02536636 ( 39209182)'
Husband  views social  Female  credit  -.04693505(-2.2465429)  -.03773476(-1.8511036)'
structure as obstacle  Male  credit  00915417 ( 76310031)  -.05232476(-  86429722)a
Husband views law as  Female credit  - 03500877(-1.0524301)  -.04685293(-1.4163627)'
obstacle  Male credit  -.05751117(-2  1869163)  -.14051447(-i  5996405)a
Wife  has made  Female credit  - 00065728(-  0240695)
husband use birth  Male credit  -.03375585(-l  7794337)
control
Wife has  Income  Female credit  .15477253 (8  1828396)
Generating Activity  Male credit  - 04342009(-3.9260772)
Wife  has Income  Female  credit  09505125 (4 7972341)
Generating Activity  Male credit  -01599552 (-I 3898103)
which  she herself
operates
Degree of  mobility  Female  credit  .31089568  (7 9629522)
Male credit  - 07537371(-4 2162371)
Wife ever travels  Female  credit  .31089568 (7.9629522)
Male credit  -.07537371(-4.2162371)
Wife ever travels  Female  credit  11742115  (5.0836324)
alone  Male credit  -.02500812(-i.8386287)
Prevent remarriage  Female credit  - 06295729(-2.779748)
(threaten  divorce)  Male credit  - 00846561(-  5652342)
Prevent remarriage  Female  credit  01169626 (.58635634)  12558993 (1.235492)'
(family pressure)  Male  credit  -.0105242 (-.85967706)  .10049414 (I  0559964)c
Prevent remarriage  Female  credit  .04096012 (2.08765 15)
(local govt.)  Male credit  .01848534 (1.5525177)
Prevent remarriage  Female  credit  .02593949 (1.2173839)  -.09438037(-l  4866644)b
(parishad)  Male credit  01867645 (I  4848455)  .02582795 (2 13191 2)b
Prevent remarriage  Female  credit  - 01546954(-.81803909)  -.01090626(-  58850542)'
(deny  permission)  Male credit  .007914  ( 68036286)  - 01045494(-.17848513)'
Household fights  Female credit  .01404173 (.77187727)
about kids  Male credit  -.01900658(-1.7803394)
Household fights  Female  credit  .04539589 (2.4881701)
about money  Male credit  .02509254 (2 3033101)
Household  fights  Female  credit  -.04694592(- 1.3519341)
about  in-laws  Male credit  - 00885686(-  47053079)
53Table  6.  Male and female credit effects  on individual em  owerment  questions (conti  ued)
Name of variable  Female/male  Exogenous credit model  Appropriate model
credit
Household fights  Female credit  .1881154  (3.5742584)
about going outside  Male credit  -02962608(-1.0165987)
Household fights  Female credit  -.02284063(-.85639037)  - 12355329(- 1.2694608) 
about loans  Male credit  .04246613 (2.1445597)  0412928  (2.1254473 ) u
Household fights  Female credit  - 02625961 (-1.4146924)  -.04901846(-2  6898298)
about chores  Male credit  -.025423  (-2.2501207)  15704929 (2  6484487)a
Wife views lack of  ed  Female credit  - 00427501(-.2370279)
as obstacle  Male credit  .01070229  (1.0109335)
Wife views lack of  Female credit  - 04081731(-2  2378315)
safety as obstacle  Male credit  -01799485(-1.6545223)
Wife views lack of  Female credit  03693626 (I 9910125)
.lobs as obstacle  Male credit  -00553119(-  51098451)
Wife vieNvs social  Female  credit  -03275009(- 1  7516397)
structure as obstacle  Male credit  02392744 (2 2276055)
Wife views laws as  Female credit  00952706 ( 36527339)
obstacle  Male credit  -.00408264(-.2639975)
Wife views religion as  Female credit  02434441  (I 3408948)  .00835915  (.47123233)a
obstacle  Male credit  -.04375407(-4  0588575)  -08219524(-1.4885503)a
a - Male I V  model  (male credit endogeneous. female credit exogenous)
b  - Female I V  model  (female credit endogenous.  male credit exogenous)
c - Male and  Female I V.  model (both male and female credit endogenous)
Note  Figures in  parentheses arc t-statistics
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